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Summary
This brief essay asks a question from the perspective of neuropsychology: What im-
plicit neural processes are triggered when one sees a comrade mortally wounded? 
The nightmares of wounded and dying combatants and civilians might be under-
stood as the simulations still active in the living neural circuitry of the warrior, long 
after the events.
Friedrich Nietzsche wrote, presciently, “Whoever fights with monsters 
should see to it that he does not become one himself. And when you stare 
for a long time into an abyss, the abyss stares back into you.”1
We have sent a new generation to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
and have learned again the lessons we had forgotten—the enormous cost 
not just to those slain or maimed, but for those returning from war whose 
inmost being has been changed forever. We have witnessed and recorded 
once more their darkness of spirit, the uneasy silence about acts witnessed 
and done, the trigger response to the sound of a car braking or the slamming 
of a door, the tense search for safety in crowded places, the dislocation from 
civil society, the loss of intimacy in family life.
Most enduring of all and least amenable to change are the sudden 
flashbacks and nightmares where images of the destruction of life and limb, 
experienced in combat, are revived. These recurrent dreams and recollec-
tions confront the combat survivor anew in each flashback with the pro-
found ethical challenge of soldiering in modern warfare. Sometimes warded 
off for decades, they return in times of vulnerability and later life crises.
I believe there is a dimension of these experiences which has not been ex-
plicitly explored in the light of the relatively new findings in the field of neuro-
psychology: the presence of mirror neurons in the human brain.2 First observed 
in monkeys, these neurons have now been confirmed in our species as well.
A recent brain imaging study showed that when we observe goal-related 
behaviors executed with effectors as different as the mouth, the hand, the 
foot, different specific sectors of our pre-motor cortex become active.3 
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These cortical sectors are the same sectors that are active when we per-
form the same actions. Whenever we look at someone performing an ac-
tion, besides the activation of various visual areas, there is a concurrent 
activation of the motor circuits for the observed action—our motor sys-
tem becomes active as if we were executing the same action we are ob-
serving. A process of action simulation automatically establishes a direct 
implicit link between agent and observer.4
The discovery of mirror neurons has been hailed as the basis both of empa-
thy and imitation, illuminating vast areas of human learning and social behavior.
[M]any researchers believe that our empathic responses present a better 
case for simulation as the means by which we identify the mental states 
of others. My having empathy for your predicament, according to this 
view, depends on simulating, in my brain, your sad facial expression. 
This action makes me feel a little sad, and thus I can recognize what you 
are experiencing. Ditto for fear, disgust, anger, and so forth. Taking this 
fairly old idea and packaging it in terms of mirror neurons, neuroscientist 
Marco Iacoboni has proposed a general account for empathy according to 
which “the core imitation circuitry would simulate (or internally imitate) 
the facial emotional expressions of other people.”5
Suppose we extrapolate these findings from the quiet precincts of the clin-
ical laboratory to the messy chaos of the war zone: are we not led to ask what 
implicit neural processes are set off when the warrior discharges his weapon 
into another living human being, in face to face encounter? What circuitry is 
activated when a soldier watches the abuse of prisoners of war? What implicit 
neural processes are triggered when one sees a comrade mortally wounded?
In military service, the warrior cannot choose what scenes she or he will 
witness. Activation of the circuits that underlie empathy are, it seems, a con-
stant in the complex fabric of our experience of others. It is reasonable to as-
sume, therefore, that as the warrior inflicts suffering and death on enemy com-
batants or on innocents trapped in the wrong place at the wrong time, the 
sights and sounds of that suffering and death will be simulated in that warrior.
In the modern science of war, military training strategies are directed 
purposefully at blocking empathy for those defined as the enemy. Stereotyp-
ing, de-humanizing, ridiculing, demonizing, discrediting—all are aimed at 
breaking down identification with the dangerous Other to promote efficient 
killing. These strategies are successful in practice: in World War II it is said 
that fewer than 20 percent of soldiers discharged their weapons at the en-
emy, while in today’s wars about 95 percent do so.
The question is, however, whether military training can override pro-
cesses that are “hard-wired” into our neural functioning, as mirror neurons 
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simulate the experience of those we injure and slay, and record the plight of 
comrades injured and slain before our eyes. It seems doubtful, as well, that 
training can be more than a temporary overlay, and it likely ceases to “cush-
ion” the simulated experience, once the warrior returns to civilian life.
We must listen carefully, then, when the veteran of our wars complains 
that he feels as if something died in him during his deployment to the war 
zone. The nightmares of wounded and dying combatants and civilians per-
haps should be understood as the simulations still active in the living neu-
ral circuitry of the warrior, long after the events—in effect the most powerful 
kind of learning of which humans are capable. It is not surprising that psychotro-
pic medication is often ineffective in easing the sense of spiritual damage and despair.
We are only at the threshold of understanding the ramifications for our 
life experience and our experience of self and other—of the intricate, subtle and 
powerful activity of mirror neurons. In an earlier century, William James raised 
the question of how Peter and Paul are able to distinguish, when they wake in the 
morning, whose thoughts belonged to each in their discussion the night before.6
Thus far, we have not approached the understanding of how, when 
we fight with monsters, we might yet escape becoming monsters ourselves. 
This we must learn from those for whom we care. They have looked long 
into the abyss, the abyss has looked back at them, and they will tell us, in 
their own good time, what eternal truths the abyss had to show them.
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